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Abstract 
At ports of entry, radiation detectors could be mounted on container gantry crane spreaders to monitor 
cargo containers entering and leaving the country. These detectors would have to withstand the extreme 
physical conditions experienced by these spreaders during normal operations. Physical shock data from 
the gable ends of a spreader were recorded during the loading and unloading of a cargo ship by two hard 
mounted PCB Piezotronics model 340A50 accelerometers and two Lansmont SAVER 9X30 units (with 
padding). The majority of large shocks were observed in the vertical direction. The Lansmont units 
recorded mean shocks of 22.215 ± 1.174 and 23.776 ± 1.140 g, while the PCB accelerometers recorded 
mean shocks of 31.608 ± 1.798 and 37.072 ± 2.015 g in this direction. Maximum shocks were as high 
as 118.854 g. A scatter plot of observed peak acceleration versus velocity change is presented to allow 
comparison with the damage boundary curve for any planned instrumentation for future systems. It is 
hoped that the results of this research will aid in the design of future crane-mounted systems. 
I. Introduction 
The SAFE Port Act requires that all containers entering the US through its 22 busiest ports be monitored 
for radiation [1]. Monitoring cargo for nuclear materials is essential for border security and non-
proliferation efforts [2, 3]. To provide better radiation detection coverage on cargo containers, some 
companies have investigated the use of detection systems directly mounted to ship-to-shore container 
gantry cranes [2–4]. These spreaders weigh in excess of 15 tons and routinely collide with shipping 
containers and other objects at operating speeds during their day-to-day operations. Mounting radiation 
detectors on this type of crane would put the sensors in the closest possible proximity to cargo containers 
while minimizing background radiation contributions but these systems would undergo large amounts of 
physical stress during loading and off-loading operations [2]. Many radiation detectors are known to be 
susceptible to mechanical shock; NaI(Tl) scintillators, for example, are relatively brittle and fragile [5–7]. 
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Figure 1.  Ship-to-Shore Container Gantry Crane, Port of Tacoma, Husky Terminal 
 
Figure 1.  Container Crane Spreader 
The Spreader Bar Radiation Detector project was a joint effort of Sandia National Laboratories and 
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Agency’s (NNSA) 
Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. Researchers in Texas A&M University’s Nuclear Security 
Science and Policy Institute assisted in this work by collecting physical shock data using two different 
types of accelerometers at the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s Test Track Facility at the Port of 
Tacoma’s Husky Terminal (Figure 1) during normal operations. It is hoped that the results of this research 
will aid in the design of future crane-mounted systems. 
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System design for these conditions can be improved with direct observation of the physical shocks 
experienced by the spreader. Damage boundary theory is a testing protocol which determines which 
shock inputs will damage a product [8]. A combination of the acceleration level and velocity change, due 
to a shock, can cause product damage; however, there is a critical acceleration and critical velocity 
change, and both must be exceeded for damage to occur. A theoretical boundary damage curve can be 
seen in Figure 3. The shock environment of the spreader bar can be measured in advance for evaluation 
against the damage boundary curve for any proposed future instrumentation. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Theoretical damage boundary curve caused by a square waveform with arbitrary scaling. Product damage only 
occurs in the shaded region. A shock input above both the critical acceleration (AC) and critical velocity change (∆VC) will 
cause damage. 
II. Materials and Methods 
To measure physical shock, two self-contained accelerometer units were fabricated at Sandia National 
Laboratory, each consisting of a Lansmont SAVER 9X30 accelerometer/data recorder and a PCB 
Piezotronics Model 340A50 tri-axial accelerometer within an aluminum housing. The PCB accelerometer 
was attached directly to the aluminum housing while the Lansmont accelerometer was braced in the case 
by high-density polyethylene foam (Figures 4 &5). The data from both accelerometers were stored by the 
Lansmont accelerometer.  The Lansmont and PCB accelerometers were designated “internal” and 
“external” respectively, in accordance with their mounting location in the housing. The PCB 
accelerometers were previously calibrated by Sandia’s Primary Standards Lab and were in calibration 
during data collection. Calibration was checked on November 11, 2013 and found to be within 
specification. The Lansmont accelerometers were calibrated by the manufacturer. Sandia preformed a 
subsequent shock table test which showed very good agreement between the Lansmont accelerometer and 
the reference accelerometer. 
 
Both units were attached to the gable ends of a spreader bar located at the Port of Tacoma’s Husky 
Terminal. The final placement of the units was decided by the Port of Tacoma; the resulting orientation 
aligned the x-axis perpendicular to the docks surface (i.e. up/down), the y-axis perpendicular to the ship 
(lateral movement of the crane), and the z-axis parallel to the length of the ship. One unit was mounted on 
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the landside of one gable end, and the other was mounted on the waterside portion of the opposite gable 
end, as shown in Figure 6. 
 
Shock and vibration data were recorded over the unloading and loading of one ship. Data were stored 
internally, on separate channels for each axis of motion, and periodically transferred to a laptop. Both 
PCB accelerometers experienced mechanical and electrical faults, primarily on the Z axis channel; data 
from this channel were not included in analysis. Mechanically, mount loosening permitted the 
accelerometer to slide, resulting in large artificial accelerations. Electronically, the interface connectors 
repeatedly came loose, generating false signals with decay times of 1 to 10 seconds due to the open circuit 
input. The false data from these records were not included in analysis. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Lansmont SAVER 9X30 and Piezotronics Model 340A50 
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Figure 5. The land-side (A) and water-side (B) accelerometers shown in their housing, mounted on the bracket attached to 
the spreader bar. The axial orientations are circled in red. 
 
Figure 6. Rendering of the spreader showing placement of the landside and waterside detectors. 
 
Data were transferred from the units to the laptop during regularly scheduled breaks in the loading and 
unloading of the ships. Data were collected beginning with the 8 AM shift on 19 March, 2012 and ending 
after the night shift, just before 8 AM on 21 March, 2012. Transfers to the laptop occurred just after 12:00 
and 17:00 (lunch break and shift change) on 19 March and 20 March. The last transfer was completed 
after the ship was fully loaded at approximately 09:20 on 21 March, 2012. The data were exported as 
Comma Separated Values (CSV) files for further data analysis.  
III. Results & Discussion 
The data were obtained over two days of unloading and loading the ship. The accelerometers stored shock 
and vibration data internally, on separate channels for each axis of motion, until it was transferred to the 
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laptop with a USB connection. All units recorded severe physical shocks during the operation period. The 
z-axis shock data from the PCB accelerometers were neglected due to electronic and mechanical 
malfunctions. Additionally, it was observed that loose electronic connections created irregular spikes with 
decay times from 1 to 10 seconds. The false data from these records were removed from analysis. The 
shock and vibration data were plotted with respect to time using the SaverXware from Lansmont. A 
sample shock time history from the Landside unit on 20:29:34 19 March, 2012 (signal 131) is reproduced 
Figure 7. 
 
The initial shock event occurs at ~40 ms. A large acceleration is detected on both the internal and external 
accelerometers. The primary shock is along the x axis, registering 38.48 g and 19.59 g on the external and 
internal accelerometers respectively. After ~20 ms and 60 ms, small aftershocks occur in alternating 
directions. Much smaller accelerations are simultaneously observed on the Y axis channels (peak 3.40 g 
internal and 7.28 g external) and the Z axis (peak 2.86 g internal). The largest accelerations were on the 
external (unpadded PCB) accelerometer. In general, the external accelerometer recorded sharp peak 
accelerations with shorter durations while the internal accelerometer recorded round lower peak 
accelerations with longer durations. This results in typically lower ∆V values for the external 
accelerometers. In this case, the internal accelerometer measured ∆V values of 57.91 and 5.39 [in s-1] for 
the X and Y axes versus 41.28 and 3.05 [in s-1 ] on the external. It is suspected that lower peak 
accelerations and rounder peak shape of the internal accelerometer is due to the padding presence of the 
small amount of polyethylene foam. The time history behavior of this shock is typical of the recorded 
data. 
            
                      
Figure 7: Sample shock time history from the Landside unit on 20:29:34 19 March, 20012 (signal 131). The data from all 
channels are plotted together and then separated and scaled by axis. The primary shock is along the X axis but smaller 
magnitude accelerations are also observed on the Y and Z axes. 
A total of 476 shock events were recorded for the landside units while only 376 events were recorded for 
the waterside units. Due to the faulty electrical connections, the sample sizes for external accelerometers 
are smaller than the internal accelerometers. For all units, the data are right skewed due to the high 
outlying maximums. Histograms of the acceleration data from each unit are shown in Figure 8. A 
summary of the relevant statistics for the total data set is included in Table 1. 
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Several trends should be highlighted. First, the data are clearly non-Gaussian and right skewed with a 
large spread in the data across all channels. Additionally, in all units the majority of large shocks occurred 
along the X axis (vertical motion) resulting in the highest mean and maximum shocks in these channels. 
The mean shock values along the X axis are ~3 times those on the respective Y axis (perpendicular to the 
ship) for each detector. For the internal detectors, the mean X axis shock value is ~6 times the respective 
mean shock on the Z axis (parallel to ship). The maximum observed shock for each unit is along its X 
axis and is significantly larger than the maximum in any other direction. Both the internal detectors 
reported low maximum and mean values for shocks along the Z axis. During this study, this direction was 
relatively sheltered from mechanical shocks. If a proposed instrument has a weak axis that is more 
vulnerable to shock, such as the joint between the photo-multiplier tube and a scintillation crystal, it 
should be aligned in this direction to minimize the potential for damage. 
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Figure 8. Histograms of the recorded shock data for each accelerometer by axis. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics of the recorded data. 
Accelerometer 
Channel 
Sample 
Size 
Standard 
Deviation 
Skew Mean [g] 
95% Confidence 
Median 
[g] 
Maximum 
[g] 
Landside Int. X 476 13.071 1.268 22.215 ± 1.174 19.940 _79.797 
Landside Int. Y 476 _6.600 3.516 _7.507 ± 0.593 _5.908 _57.941 
Landside Int. Z 476 _1.977 1.558 _3.711 ± 0.178 _3.204 _14.740 
Landside Ext. X 453 19.523 1.080 31.608 ± 1.798 27.246 111.231 
Landside Ext. Y 415 _9.449 2.416 _8.255 ± 0.912 _5.817 _64.661 
Waterside Int. X 376 11.279 1.744 23.776 ± 1.140 22.991 _98.749 
Waterside Int. Y 376 _7.375 4.403 _7.375 ± 0.745 _5.618 _60.059 
Waterside Int. Z 376 _2.267 1.205 _4.476 ± 0.229 _3.915 _13.477 
Waterside Ext. X 326 15.566 0.782 37.072 ± 2.015 35.538 118.854 
Waterside Ext. Y 319 _7.128 2.521 11.259 ± 0.782 _9.656 _64.086 
 
It is noted that the external accelerometers recorded larger mean and maximum shocks than the internal 
detectors with a greater spread in the data. It is unclear if this variance is due to differences in function 
between the accelerometer models used or a result of the padding used on the internal accelerometers. 
Additionally, the landside accelerometers show slightly more variance than the waterside ones. Despite 
this, the waterside units reported the largest maximum shock for both the internal and external 
accelerometers. However, peak acceleration alone will not cause damage; a sufficient velocity change, 
from a shock, must also occur. There is a critical acceleration and critical velocity change, and both must 
be exceeded for damage to result. The critical acceleration and critical velocity change required to cause 
damage will be instrument dependent. For example, Saint Gobian rates its 2” X 18”NaI(Tl) detectors for 
maximum shocks of 5g’s at 10 ms in any direction while its PolyScin® NaI(Tl) are rated for 200g’s at 5 
ms.  To aid in future instrumentation selection, a cumulative scatterplot of the observed peak 
accelerations and corresponding ∆V is provided in Figure 9, along with scaled plots of each axis for 
comparison with product damage boundary curves.  
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Figure 9: Peak acceleration [g] versus velocity change [in s-1]. Landside values are plotted as + ; Waterside values as . A 
cumulative data set and scaled plot for each axis is presented. 
 
A few key observations can be made from these plots. First, the highest accelerations and ∆V values are 
observed along the X axis, while the lowest are observed along the Z axis. When designing a system, the 
weakest axis should be aligned parallel to the length of dock to minimize the possibility of damage. 
Additionally, there is not a significant difference between the maximum events for the landside and 
waterside units, though there is a noticeable difference between the external and internal accelerometers. 
The unpadded external accelerometers show higher shocks with lower velocity changes, while the padded 
internal accelerometers show lower peak shocks with larger velocity changes. This is believed to be due 
to small amounts of polyethylene padding present around the internal units, as the function of padding is 
to translate high acceleration events outside the packaging to lower acceleration events for the internal 
object. Any system designed to operate in these environments must be able to limit input accelerations 
below critical accelerations levels. Low Z padding is the suggested method to minimize attenuation and 
preserve detector sensitivity.  
IV. Conclusions 
 
This work shows that detection systems mounted on the gable ends of a spreader will operate in an 
extreme shock environment. During loading and unloading shifts, crane operators are mainly concerned 
with working as quickly as possible and will not slow down for fragile systems.  The largest peak 
accelerations and most potentially damaging events were observed along the vertical axis. The slightly 
padded Lansmont units recorded mean shocks of 22.215 ± 1.174 and 23.776 ± 1.140 g’s with 
maximum shocks of 79.797 and 98.749 g’s in this direction; the hard-mounted PCB accelerometers 
recorded mean shocks of 31.608 ± 1.798 and 37.072 ± 2.015 g’s with maximum shocks of 111.231 and 
118.854 g’s. The lowest peak accelerations and least potentially damaging events were observed parallel 
to the dock. A scatterplot of the observed peak accelerations and corresponding ∆V in the environment is 
presented to aid instrumentation selection for future systems. Systems should be designed to withstand 
maximum shock inputs of over 120 g’s in the vertical direction, over 60g’s in the lateral direction of the 
crane, and 20 g’s parallel to the dock, or sufficiently cushioned to lower received internal accelerations to 
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acceptable levels for a given instrument. Low-Z padding is suggested to stabilize the detector and protect 
it from large shocks while not overly inhibiting the detection mechanisms. 
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